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Extraterritorial discovery between litigants located in different nations
has long been a source of conflict in foreign relations. Such discovery
efforts not only can be costly and cumbersome, but also may be perceived
by foreign nations as infringing upon their sovereign rights. In 1968, in
an attempt to resolve this problem, the United States and twenty-three
other countries met at the Hague and drafted the Hague Convention on
the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters.' The
Convention, which the United States and nineteen other nations have
signed,2 outlines specific procedures by which member states may obtain
evidence located in the territory of other signatories. United States
courts, however, dissatisfied with the Convention's procedures, have re-
peatedly disregarded them, resorting instead to the discovery procedures
prescribed in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In turn, many for-
eign countries have revived their protests that the extraterritorial applica-
tion of the Federal Rules impinges upon their sovereignty.
In response to this conflict, and after years of silence, the Supreme
Court recently decided Socidtd Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v.
United States District Court.3 In Socidtd, the Court held that U.S. courts
t J.D. candidate, Yale Law School.
1. Opened for signature March 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 847 U.N.T.S.
231 [hereinafter Convention].
2. Signatories to the Convention include Argentina, Barbados, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia,
Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg,
Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom,
and the United States. 8 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIREcTORY (pt. VII) 15 (1988).
Switzerland is considering ratification of the Convention. Brief of Government of Switzerland
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2, Socit6 Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v.
United States District Court, 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987) (No. 85-1695).
3. 462 U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987). For other discussions of Socidtd, see Note, A Look
Behind the Aerospatiale Curtain, or Why the Hague Evidence Convention Had to Be Effectively
Nullified, 23 TEx. INT'L L.J. 269 (1988); Recent Development, 29 HARV. INT'L L.J. 160
(1988); Recent Development, 24 STAN. J. IN'L L. 309 (1987); Recent Development, 17 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 591 (1987); Rogers, On the Exclusivity of the Hague Evidence Convention,
21 TEx. INT'L L.J. 441 (1986).
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must conduct a case-by-case comity analysis to determine whether to ap-
ply the discovery procedures described in the Convention or those of the
Federal Rules.4 The Court cited the Tentative Draft of the Restatement
of Foreign Relations Law of the United States5 as containing considera-
tions "relevant to any comity analysis."' 6 It did not identify, however,
more precise principles that the lower courts should employ in con-
ducting the type of comity analysis it envisioned.
This Comment argues for the adoption of a principled comity analysis
that focuses solely on American interests instead of on a balancing of
American and foreign interests as suggested by the Restatement. Section
I reviews the history of the Convention and discusses the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Socidtd. Section II demonstrates that the comity
analysis proposed in Socidtd and outlined in the Restatement, while iden-
tifying certain American interests in particular cases, fails to provide an
underlying principle that can guide lower courts in weighing those inter-
ests. Finally, section III argues that what is actually at issue in a comity
analysis is the maximization of U.S. interests, and describes the analyti-
cal and practical effects of a recognition of the importance of such inter-
ests. This Comment concludes that the American interests approach
would clarify the task of U.S. courts conducting comity analyses in the
context of extraterritorial discovery disputes, thereby eliminating many
of the difficulties currently hindering extraterritorial discovery.
I. The Convention and Socidtj
A. The Convention's History and Provisions
In 1968, representatives from twenty civil law countries and four com-
mon law countries convened at the Hague in an effort to reconcile differ-
ences among their respective systems of civil procedure relating to the
procurement of evidence. 7 The negotiations focused on the development
of a system for obtaining evidence abroad that would be "tolerable" to
the state fulfilling an extraterritorial discovery request and would result
in the production of evidence that would be "utilizable" in the requesting
state.8 The product of this effort, the Hague Evidence Convention, was a
4. Socidtd, 107 S. Ct. at 2555-56.
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 437 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
6. Socidtd, 107 S. Ct. at 2556 n.28.
7. Brief of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
as Amicus Curiae at 7, Sociitd (No. 85-1695) (citing 4 CONFERENCE DE LA HAYE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PRIVft, ACTES ET DOCUMENTS DE LA ONZIEME SESSION 202 (1970)).
8. Amram, Explanatory Report on the Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in
Civil or Commercial Matters, in S. EXEC. Doc. A, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1972).
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major improvement for American litigants over the pre-Convention re-
gime, in which obtaining evidence located abroad was solely a matter of
international comity and customary international law.9
Pursuant to Chapter I of the Convention, discovery from involuntary
witnesses can be obtained through "Letters of Request" sent by a court
of the requesting state to the designated Central Authority in the receiv-
ing state, asking the receiving state for assistance in compelling produc-
tion of the information.10 The Central Authority of the receiving state
first determines whether the request complies with the provisions of the
Convention,"1 and then forwards the request to the local authority com-
petent to execute it.12 If the request does not fulfill the Convention's
requirements, the Central Authority conveys its objections to the author-
ity in the requesting state that transmitted the Letter.13
Under Chapter II, a requesting state may obtain information from vol-
untary witnesses by appointing a "commissioner" as its representative or
by contacting its own consular officers in the foreign state to take the
evidence.14 The commissioner or consular officer then requests permis-
sion from the Central Authority in the receiving state to take evidence
from the witness and proceeds, if permission is granted, according to the
conditions specified by the Central Authority.1
Despite the apparent simplicity of the Convention, a number of its pro-
visions are problematic. For example, the Convention allows the
9. Oxman, The Choice Between Direct Discovery and Other Means of Obtaining Evidence
Abroad: The Impact of the Hague Evidence Convention, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 733, 747 n.4
(1983).
10. Convention, supra note 1, arts. 1-2.
11. Id. art. 5. Article 3 of the Convention provides:
A Letter of Request shall specify-
(a) the authority requesting its execution and the authority requested to execute it, if
known to the requesting authority;
(b) the names and addresses of the parties to the proceedings and their representatives,
if any;
(c) the nature of the proceedings for which the evidence is required, giving all neces-
sary information in regard thereto;
(d) the evidence to be obtained or other judicial act to be performed. Where appropri-
ate, the Letter shall specify, inter alia-
(e) the names and addresses of the persons to be examined;
(f) the questions to be put to the persons to be examined or a statement of the subject-
matter about which they are to be examined;
(g) the documents or other property, real or personal, to be inspected;
(h) any requirement that the evidence is to be given on oath or affirmation, and any
special form to be used;
(i) any special method or procedure to be followed under Article 9.
12. Id. art. 2.
13. Id. art. 5.
14. Id. arts. 15, 17.
15. Id. art. 19.
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receiving state considerable latitude in determining whether to execute
Letters of Request. If the Central Authority decides that execution of
the request would not fall "within the functions of the judiciary" or
would prejudice the "sovereignty or security" of the state, the request
may be summarily refused.16 Moreover, the local authority will not com-
pel an individual to give evidence if she has a "privilege or duty" not to
provide that evidence under the law of the executing state, nor may it
compel the production of evidence protected by the law of the requesting
state or by the law of a relevant third state.17 Finally, and most impor-
tantly, a signatory state may "declare that it will not execute Letters of
Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of docu-
ments as known in Common Law countries." '
Even if the receiving state executes the Letter of Request, the local
judicial authority "shall apply its own law as to the methods and proce-
dures to be followed" in obtaining the evidence.19 Since laws defining the
proper methods of obtaining evidence vary greatly among nations, evi-
dence obtained through Convention procedures may not qualify for ad-
mission in the requesting state's courts. Although an executing state
may attempt to comply with requests for the use of special procedures
16. Id. art. 12; see also Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan American World Airways, 103 F.R.D.
42,48 (D.D.C. 1984) (noting ability of government of Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) to
deny Letters of Request "if, in its sole discretion, a response would be contrary to the sover-
eignty or security interests" of that country).
17. Convention, supra note 1, art. 11; see also Shemanski, Obtaining Evidence in the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany: The Impact of the Hague Evidence Convention on German-American
Judicial Cooperation, 17 INT'L LAW. 465, 485-86 (1983) (enumerating German privileges
based on familial relationships, professional secrecy, technical grounds such as immediate fi-
nancial damage, disgrace or prosecution of family members, or disclosure of a trade secret,
which preclude enforcement of Letter of Request).
18. Convention, supra note 1, art. 23. There has been some debate over whether the term
"pretrial" as used in the Convention was meant to have the same meaning it has in the United
States. According to the Report of the U.S. Delegation to the Special Commission on the
Operation of the Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or
Commercial Matters, reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1417, 1421 (1978) [hereinafter Report of the U.S.
Delegation], the delegates to the Convention from civil law countries demonstrated a "gross
misunderstanding" of the meaning of "pretrial discovery," interpreting the phrase to involve
the procurement of evidence prior to the initiation of litigation for the purpose of gathering
evidence to file suit. Nonetheless, the FRG, Italy, Luxembourg,, and Portugal still maintain
unqualified Article 23 declarations. 8 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY, supra note
2, at 17-18, 20. Such declarations may well be enforced by foreign courts. In SEC v. Banca
delia Svizzera Italiana, No. 81 Civ. 1836 (MP) (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 27, 1981), the Magistrate's
Court of Milan refused to compel production of documents pursuant to Italy's declaration
under Article 23. Brief for the United States and the Securities and Exchange Commission as
Amici Curiae at 17 n.17, Socidtd (No. 85-1695) (citing Statement on the Examination of Wit-
nesses as Requested by a Foreign Letter Rogatory (Pret. Milano, Italy Oct. 2, 1985)); see also
Shemanski, supra note 17, at 481-82 (Central Authority of FRG refused to fulfill Letter of
Request, and Munich Higher Regional Court affirmed, because trial had not yet begun and
American court had not yet scrutinized evidentiary request).
19. Convention, supra note 1, art. 9.
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necessary for the admissibility of the evidence in the requesting state, this
effort will only be made to the extent that a requested special procedure
is not "incompatible with the internal law of the State of execution[,] or
is impossible of performance by reason of its internal practice and proce-
dure or by reason of practical difficulties."'20 Even the presence of an
attorney from the requesting state to assist with special procedures re-
quires the affirmative approval of the executing state.21 The result is that
discovery under the Convention's procedures may lead only to the pro-
curement of evidence that is inadmissible in the requesting state's
courts.
22
Finally, even if the local authority in the foreign state complies with
the Letter of Request and permits the use of the appropriate special pro-
cedures, the measure of compulsion applied by that authority to enforce
the order will only be equivalent to that provided by local law.23 Local
laws, however, are frequently ineffective, thus further reducing the likeli-
hood of successful discovery under the Convention. 2
4
As a consequence of these limitations on the scope and quality of evi-
dence obtainable under the Convention, and the additional time and
expense often involved in following the Convention's procedures, 25
American litigants typically prefer that discovery proceed under the Fed-
eral Rules. 26 The more familiar Federal Rules frequently cost less to
follow, and allow discovery that is "often significantly broader than is
permitted in other jurisdictions. ' 27 Furthermore, under the Federal
Rules, if the holder of the information that is located in another country
20. Id.; see also In re Anschuetz & Co., GmbH, 754 F.2d 602, 610 (5th Cir. 1985) ("[Tlhe
breadth of evidence ordinarily expected from a full fledged American deposition might be
restricted for any number of reasons: the foreign state's own procedures might limit or fore-
close cross-examination, full participation of counsel might not be allowed, or a verbatim rec-
ord might not result, thus limiting admissability of testimony in an American court."), vacated
sub nor., Anschuetz & Co., GmbH v. Mississippi River Bridge Auth., 107 S. Ct. 3223 (1987).
21. Convention, supra note 1, art. 8.
22. Work v. Bier, 106 F.R.D. 45, 54-55 (D.D.C. 1985) (discussing difficulty of obtaining
admissible evidence in FRG under Convention).
23. Convention, supra note 1, art. 10.
24. See Brief for the United States and the Securities and Exchange Commission at 16
n.16, Sociitd (No. 85-1695) (citing In re Testimony of Constandi Nasser, Trib. admin. de
Paris, 6e section-2e chambre, No. 51546/6 (Dec. 17, 1985), in which French court imposed
only "minor fine" on French witness who refused to provide evidence requested in Letter of
Request).
25. Struve, Discovery from Foreign Parties in Civil Cases Before U.S. Courts, 16 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 1101, 1111 (1984) ("The Hague Convention represents a mode of discovery
which is significantly less certain, less effective, more costly and more burdensome" than the
Federal Rules).
26. Platto, Taking Evidence Abroad for Use in Civil Cases in the United States-A Practical
Guide, 16 INT'L LAW. 575, 577 (1982) (advising American litigants to avoid Convention if
evidence can be obtained without it).




is a party, she must cooperate or risk losing the lawsuit altogether.28 In
response to these considerations, lower courts have frequently granted
discovery under the Federal Rules, even in nations which are signatories
to the Convention.
29
Predictably, the American preference for the Federal Rules has cre-
ated intense friction in the international litigation arena.30 Indeed, "[n]o
aspect of the extension of the American legal system beyond the territo-
rial frontier of the United States has given rise to so much friction as the
request for documents associated with investigation and litigation in the
United States."' 3 1 The breadth of discovery provided by the Federal
Rules, together with the active participation of litigants in the discovery
process, has been a constant source of irritation, particularly to civil law
countries, where such activity is often considered a threat to the sover-
eignty of the state and, in some cases, even a crime.
32
Nonetheless, U.S. courts and commentators have been reluctant to
abandon the American approach to discovery. A standard argument is
that if foreign persons choose to do business in the United States or
otherwise to benefit from the laws of the United States, then they should
be obliged to follow the Federal Rules in the event of litigation.33 In
addition, even when American companies are conducting business
abroad and litigation results, there is a sense that the American discovery
system is likely to be fairer and more objective in balancing the interests
of the two parties.34 United States courts sometimes have doubts about
the impartiality of foreign governments upon which they would have to
rely for discovery if they were to order discovery to proceed under the
Convention.
3 5
Mistrust and confusion are enhanced by the differing conceptions of
the role of the judiciary in civil and common law countries. Under a
common law system, judges rely primarily on the adversary parties to
28. Shemanski, supra note 17, at 484.
29. Maier, Extraterritorial Discovery: Cooperation, Coercion and the Hague Evidence Con-
vention, 19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 239, 240 n.3 (1986).
30. See Brief for the Federal Republic of Germany as Amicus Curiae at 14 n.40, Socidtd
(No. 85-1695) (citing Letter from Embassy of FRG to U.S. Department of State (Nov. 7,
1983), reprinted in Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 1, Volkswagenwerk v.
Falzon, 465 U.S. 1014 (1983) (No. 82-1888)).
31. RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 437 note 1.
32. See Shemanski, supra note 17, at 479; D. ROSENTHAL & W. KNIGHTON, NATIONAL
LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE 75 (1982).
33. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 437 note 1.
34. D. ROSENTHAL & W. KNIGHTON, supra note 32, at 71.
35. See, e.g., In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248, 1256 (7th Cir. 1980)
(briefs presented by foreign governments found by court to be significantly biased in favor of
foreign litigant).
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provide the necessary facts through the discovery process.3 6 In civil law
countries, on the other hand, judges act as inquisitors and are often inde-
pendently involved in compiling the evidence that will provide the basis
for the court's decision.37 Similarly, the division in common law coun-
tries between the pretrial and the trial stages is not formally evident in
civil law countries.38 Hence, the discovery process in civil law countries
is normally perceived as part of an official government function, 39 and
encroaching upon that function is viewed as a direct infringement upon
the sovereignty of the state.4°
It would appear at first glance that since the Convention was ratified
after the adoption of the Federal Rules, the Convention's procedures,
under the "latest law controls" rule, should govern all discovery by
American litigants in member states. The preamble of the Convention,
however, does not indicate that its provisions are mandatory,4 1 and the
Supreme Court held in Sociitd that the Convention does not preclude the
use of alternate means of obtaining evidence. 42
Since both the Convention and the Federal Rules are of equal legal
force, the dilemma faced by U.S. courts has been choosing which set of
procedures to apply. Prior to Socidtd, lower courts and commentators
had adopted several different approaches. At one extreme, some com-
mentators urged that the Convention should provide the exclusive means
of obtaining evidence from foreign parties, since application of the Fed-
eral Rules would defeat the purpose of the Convention. 43 Following a
more moderate approach, a number of courts instead required that the
36. Jones, International Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and a Program for Reform,
62 YALE L.J. 515, 531 (1953).
37. Id
38. See R. SCHLESINGER, H. BAADE, M. DAMASKA & P. HERZOG, COMPARATIVE LAW
426-27 (5th ed. 1980) [hereinafter COMPARATIVE LAW].
39. Maier, supra note 29, at 242-43.
40. Edwards, Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, 18 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 646, 647 (1969). It should be noted, however, that the American scope of discov-
ery is not offensive just to civil law countries. Those countries that follow the common law
tradition, such as the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, find the scope of American
pretrial discovery to be equally exasperating. D. ROSENTHAL & W. KNIGHTON, supra note
32, at 68-70.
41. Convention, supra note 1, preamble.
42. Sociitd, 107 S. Ct. at 2552 ("In the absence of explicit textual support, we are unable to
accept the hypothesis that the common law contracting States abjured recourse to all pre-
existing discovery procedures at the same time that they accepted the possibility that a con-
tracting Party could unilaterally abrogate even the Convention's procedures." (footnote
omitted)).
43. See, e.g., Radvan, The Hague Evidence Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad
in Civil and Commercial Matters: Several Notes Concerning Its Scope, Method and Compul-
sion, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1031 (1985); Heck, U.S. Misinterpretation of the Hague




Convention be the discovery method of first resort, arguing that such a
rule would respect the sovereignty of foreign states yet leave open the
possibility of discovery under the Federal Rules if the Convention proved
ineffective.44 More recently, some courts suggested that use of the Con-
vention is optional with respect to foreign parties over whom a court has




It was this conflict between the Federal Rules and the Convention that
the Supreme Court recently addressed in Socidtd. The decision repre-
sented the first attempt by the Court in twenty-nine years to addres'
some of the conflicts created by the breadth of American discovery pro-
cedures.46 The extent of the concern over the outcome was demonstrated
by the numerous amici briefs filed by representatives of the Convention's
signatories and by American organizations. 47
In Socidtd, the pilot and passenger of an airplane manufactured by two
corporations owned by the government of France brought suit in the
Federal District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, claiming that
they had suffered personal injuries as a result of the crash of the airplane.
The French defendants responded to initial discovery requests under the
Federal Rules without objection, but later fied a motion for a protective
order, arguing that since they were French corporations and discovery
was to be conducted in France, the Convention should provide the exclu-
sive procedures for conducting discovery. The Magistrate denied the de-
fendants' motion, reasoning that the U.S. interest in protecting its
citizens from defective foreign products outweighed the French interest
in protecting its citizens from broad American discovery procedures.
The Eighth Circuit permitted immediate appellate review, due to the sig-
44. See, e.g., Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. American Pfauter Corp., 100 F.R.D. 58 (E.D. Pa.
1983); Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Pan American World Airways, 103 F.R.D. 42, 51 (D.D.C.
1984).
45. See, eg., In re Anschuetz & Co., GmbH, 754 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1985), vacated sub
nom., Anschuetz & Co., GmbH v. Mississippi River Bridge Auth., 107 S. Ct. 3223 (1987).
46. The last such case heard by the Court, and the only one since World War II, was
Soci6t6 Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357
U.S. 197 (1958). In Rogers, the Court addressed the conflict created by a Swiss penal statute
that prohibited the discovery permitted under the Federal Rules. The Court held that the
Swiss plaintiff could not be sanctioned for failing to provide the requested evidence, since Swiss
blocking statutes prohibited such discovery, and the Swiss plaintiff had made a good faith
effort to comply with the American court order.
47. Briefs were filed by representatives from France, Italy, Germany, Switzerland, and
several American organizations, including the Securities and Exchange Commission on behalf
of the U.S. government.
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nificance of the question presented, but ultimately denied the mandamus
petition, holding that the Convention is inapplicable to foreign litigants
over whom a lower court has jurisdiction.
48
After considering and rejecting numerous means of dealing with the
conflict,49 the Supreme Court ultimately adopted the approach of a case-
by-case comity analysis to resolve extraterritorial discovery disputes
under the Convention.50 The Court summarily rejected the Court of Ap-
peal's position, noting that "the text of the Convention draws no distinc-
tion between evidence obtained from third parties and that obtained from
the litigants themselves."' 51 In addition, the Court indicated that under
the text of the Convention, U.S. courts are not required to adhere to the
procedures outlined in the Convention, nor are they obliged to attempt to
use the Convention's procedures first before resorting to the Federal
Rules.5 2 Thus, given the countervailing U.S. interest in the "'just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination' of litigation, '5 3 forcing U.S.
courts to comply with either set of rules would be "unwise. '5 4 The
Court concluded that "the concept of international comity requires in
this context a more particularized analysis of the respective interests of
the foreign nation and the requesting nation .... ,,55 To assist the lower
courts in conducting this individual comity analysis, the Court referred
to the provisions of the Restatement as containing "concerns that guide a
comity analysis."' 56 But the development of more specific principles or
rules was left to the lower courts.
II. Comity and the Restatement: A Critique
The concept of comity between nations was first discussed by the
Supreme Court in 1797 in Emory v. Grenough.5 7 Citing Ulrich Huber, a
Dutch jurist of the seventeenth century, the Court stated:
"By the courtesy of nations, whatever laws are carried into execution,
within the limits of any government, are considered as having the same
effect every where, so far as they do not occasion a prejudice to the rights of
the other governments, or their citizens .... [N]othing would be more
inconvenient in the promiscuous intercourse and practice of mankind, than
48. Socidtd, 107 S. Ct. at 2546-48.
49. Id. at 2550-56.
50. Id. at 2555-56.
51. Id. at 2554.
52. Id. at 2553-55.
53. Id. at 2555 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 1).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 2555 n.28.




that what was valid by the laws of one place, should be rendered of no effect
elsewhere, by a diversity of law .... -58
Just short of a century later the Court rearticulated its notion of com-
ity in Hilton v. Guyot,59 in what is perhaps the Court's most frequently
cited comity formulation to date:
"Comity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on
the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is
the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legisla-
tive, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to
international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or
of other persons who are under the protection of its laws. 6°
A. Problems with the Concept of Comity
In recent years, various attempts have been made by lower courts and
by commentators to give some content to the Hilton Court's abstract
notion of comity through the articulation of factors that are pertinent to
a comity analysis. 61 But the mere proviso of the Supreme Court that
comity is "neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor
of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other," has not provided the
definitional guidance necessary either to select factors or to make deci-
sions based on those factors. Consequently, decisions by courts attempt-
ing a comity analysis have been marked by inconsistency,
unpredictability, and, at times, even unfairness. 62 With respect to extra-
territorial discovery in particular, the lack of a more explicit standard
has thus led lower courts to conduct only a cursory evaluation of factors
deemed relevant.63 The inherent bias of U.S. courts toward use of the
58. Id. at 370 n.* (quoting 2 HUBERUS, B.I., Tit. 3, 260).
59. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
60. Id at 163-64.
61. See infra note 70.
62. Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("Since comity
varies according to the factual circumstances surrounding each claim for its recognition, the
absolute boundaries of the duties it imposes are inherently uncertain.").
63. For instance, numerous courts have abandoned the Convention when the receiving
country in question has declared, pursuant to article 23 of the Convention, that it will not
execute Letters of Request that are "issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of
documents as known in Common Law countries." See, eg., In re Anschuetz & Co., GmbH,
754 F.2d 602, 612 (5th Cir. 1985), vacated sub nor., Anschuetz & Co., GmbH v. Mississippi
River Bridge Auth., 107 S. Ct. 3223 (1987); Wilson v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 489
N.Y.S.2d 575, 578 (A.D. 1985). These courts summarily determined that their need for the
documents superceded the foreign sovereign's interest. Since article 23 is, however, not clearly
designed to bar all discovery of documents but rather to limit the scope of discovery, it was
probably not necessary for these court to abandon the Convention completely. Report of the
U.S. Delegation, supra note 18, at 1421; see also Shemanski, supra note 17, at 480. Other
courts have been similarly cursory in their analysis. See, eg., Murphy v. Reifenhauser K.G.
Maschinenfabrik, 101 F.R.D. 360, 363 (D. Vt. 1984) (comity does not require use of Conven-
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more familiar Federal Rules has resulted in ill-considered decisions
favoring the party seeking discovery.64 Even when the lower courts have
conducted a more thoughtful evaluation of what they consider to be rele-
vant factors, the lack of definition of the concept of comity has often
resulted in conflicting holdings under similar factual circumstances. 65
Despite the obvious weaknesses of many of these decisions, their funda-
mental unfairness has more often than not gone unremedied, since appel-
late review of trial court decisions on discovery issues is only available
before final judgment through the unusual and difficult process of ex-
traordinary writ.
66
The holding in Sociit6 has the potential to perpetuate the foregoing
difficulties. In Socite, the Court vaguely summarized the doctrine of
comity as "the spirit of cooperation in which a domestic tribunal ap-
proaches the resolution of cases touching the laws and interests of other
sovereign states."' 67 After noting that "the concept of international com-
ity requires in this context a more particularized analysis of the respec-
tive interests of the foreign nation and the requesting nation, ' 68 the
Court cited certain factors proposed by the seventh tentative draft of the
revised Restatement of Foreign Relations Law as "relevant" to this "par-
ticularized analysis."'69 Neither the opinion nor the Restatement, how-
ever, provide an underlying definition of comity that would better guide
the selection of relevant factors or serve as a basis for future court deci-
sions.70 As Justice Blackmun noted in his separate opinion in Socidtd,
tion during latter stages of discovery, particularly where it appears that a request under Con-
vention would be "futile"); Lasky v. Continental Prod. Corp., 569 F. Supp. 1227, 1229 (E.D.
Pa. 1983) (uncertainty whether plaintiff's discovery request would violate German law or Ger-
man sovereignty led to denial of protective order); Work v. Bier, 106 F.R.D. 45, 55 (D.D.C.
1985) (relying primarily on law review article, court concluded that it was "obvious" that
Convention would be "highly ineffectual").
64. Oxman, supra note 9, at 741-42.
65. Gebr. Eickhoff Maschinenfabrik und Eisengieberei mbH v. Starcher, 328 S.E.2d 492,
505 (W. Va. 1985) (reconciling contradictory decisions).
66. Boreri v. Fiat S.P.A., 763 F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1985) (review of lower court's decision
to use Convention as opposed to Federal Rules denied).
67. 107 S. Ct. at 2555 n.27.
68. Id. at 2555 (footnote omitted).
69. Id. at 2555 n.28.
70. Numerous attempts have been made, in contexts other than discovery, to propose fac-
tors that are relevant to a comity analysis, and all or some may be relevant in particular extra-
territorial discovery cases. Part of the objective of this Comment is to provide a framework for
a comity analysis that can effectively utilize not only the Restatement factors but also any
additional factors, such as those suggested below, when they become relevant to American
interests.
In Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976), the court
suggested the following factors:
the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality or allegiance of the parties
and the location or principal places of business of corporations, the extent to which en-
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the majority opinion fails "to provide lower courts with any meaningful
guidance for carrying out [the Court's case-by-case] inquiry.
'71
B. Application of the Restatement Approach to Comity
The Restatement typifies the approach taken by many lower courts
when conducting a comity analysis: it simply lists a number of factors
that should be balanced by courts considering whether to compel pro-
duction of evidence located abroad under the Federal Rules or the Con-
vention. The basic assumption underlying the Restatement's analysis is
that foreign and American interests should be weighed against each other
on an equal basis. A review of section 437 of the Restatement explains
how it is meant to operate in practice:
(1)(a) [A] court or agency in the United States, when authorized by statute
or rule of court, may order a person subject to its jurisdiction to produce
forcement by either state can be expected to achieve compliance, the relative significance
of effects on the United States as compared with those elsewhere, the extent to which
there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce, the foreseeability of such
effect, and the relative importance to the violations charged of conduct within the United
States as compared with conduct abroad.
Id. at 614 (footnote omitted).
The Third Circuit has suggested some additional considerations when the issue is the appli-
cation of antitrust laws outside the United States:
1. Degree of conflict with foreign law or policy;
2. Nationality of the parties;
3. Relative importance of the alleged violation of conduct here compared to that abroad;
4. Availability of a remedy abroad and the pendency of litigation there;
5. Existence of intent to harm or affect American commerce and its foreseeability;
6. Possible effect upon foreign relations if the court exercises jurisdiction and grants
relief,
7. If relief is granted, whether a party will be placed in the position of being forced to
perform an act illegal in either country or be under conflicting requirements by both
countries;
8. Whether the court can make its order effective;
9. Whether an order for relief would be acceptable in this country if made by the foreign
nation under similar circumstances;
10. Whether a treaty with the affected nations has addressed the issue.
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297-98 (3d Cir. 1979).
In the context of international discovery disputes, many courts have relied upon section 40
of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
(1965). See, e.g., Compagnie Francaise d'Assurance v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 105 F.R.D. 16,
29-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). That section suggests considering the following factors when the laws
of two states with concurrent enforcement jurisdiction over the conduct conflict:
(a) vital national interests of each of the states,
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions would
impose upon the person,
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of the other
state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably be expected
to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state.
71. Id. at 2558 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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documents, objects, or other information relevant to an action or investiga-
tion, even if the information or the person in possession of the information
is outside the United States....
(c) In issuing an order directing production of information located
abroad, a court or agency in the United States should take into account
[1] the importance to the investigation or litigation of the documents or
other information requested; [2] the degree of specificity of the request;
[3] whether the information originated in the United States; [4] the availa-
bility of alternative means of securing the information; and [5] the extent to
which non-compliance with the request would undermine important inter-
ests of the United States, or compliance with the request would undermine
important interests of the state where the information is located.
Each of the factors listed in the Restatement flows from some short- or
long-term American domestic or external interest. Factors (1) and (4),
for example, assist a court in assessing the significance of the short-term,
domestic U.S. interest in the fair resolution of a specific dispute. Consid-
eration of the "importance" and "availability" of documents is crucial to
a court's evaluation of the litigant's need for the discovery.
Factors (2) and (3), on the other hand, address the short-term Ameri-
can interest in the fair treatment of the individual from whom discovery
is sought. "[T]he degree of specificity of the request" helps a court deter-
mine whether the burden that it might be placing upon the person from
whom discovery is sought is justified, considering both the difficulty of
providing the requested information and the degree to which the request
runs contrary to the normal privileges to which the individual would be
entitled in her own country. "[W]hether the information originated in
the United States" informs the court as to whether the person holding
the evidence brought the situation upon herself, either by benefiting from
U.S. laws while conducting her affairs in the United States, or by inten-
tionally moving the information to another state to block discovery. In
either case, the party is considered to deserve less consideration for the
difficulties she might endure in providing the discovery.
Finally, the fifth factor listed in the Restatement, referring to "impor-
tant interests" of the United States and of the foreign state, is a catch-all
category that includes within it the short-term, domestic policy interests
of the United States in the fair resolution of the particular case at issue,
as well as the long-term external American interests in maintaining posi-
tive relations with the foreign country. In the comments on factor (5),




interests but still implicitly maintains that foreign interests are something
distinct from both.
72
This distinction between the interests of the foreign nation and U.S.
interests is artificial, and confuses the basic purpose of a realistic comity
analysis. Nonetheless, the factors suggested by the Restatement are still
relevant to an individualized comity decision and should not be dis-
carded.73  Instead, the principle underlying the use of these factors
should be clarified to give courts a set of workable guidelines for their
task.
72. RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 437 comment c.
73. The Restatement is useful in defining the American interests at stake in any given case.
However, the factors listed by the Restatement do not represent a comprehensive list of all the
considerations.that might bear on a comity analysis. The Sociit6 Court recognized this when
it indicated that "the Restatement may not represent a consensus of international views on the
scope of the District Court's power to order foreign discovery in the face of objections by
foreign states." 107 S. Ct. at 2555-56 n.28. Nonetheless, the Court explicitly stated that "[t]he
nature of the concerns that guide a comity analysis are suggested by the Restatement." Id. at
2555 (citation omitted). In spite of its elevation to the status of "guide," the Restatement is
incomplete.
An initial flaw of the Restatement is that it focuses solely on the treatment of parties to the
dispute, and fails to address how the distinction between parties and non-parties might bear on
a court's decision. In particular, the additional offense to foreign states often associated with
discovery from non-parties might strongly counsel in favor of the Convention when informa-
tion is sought from non-parties.
A second weakness of the Restatement is that it only addresses those situations in which a
court is compelling a party to provide evidence under the Federal Rules. According to a com-
ment, "[R]equests to produce documents or information located abroad should, as a matter of
good practice, be issued as an order by the court, not merely in the form of a demand by a
private party." RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 437 comment a. The extraterritorial use of
compulsive discovery measures by an American court is certain to be less well received by the
foreign state than the passive allowance of voluntary production of the same information, as it
carries with it the official sanction of the U.S. government. Discovery requests that are inde-
pendently served upon a foreign witness by a litigant in an American court are less offensive,
since the parties involved are acting independently of their governments. Thus it is not in the
United States' best interest for its courts to interfere with voluntary production of evidence
under the Federal Rules, since any damage to positive relations between the countries is likely
to be minimal.
A final failing of the Restatement is that it omits any distinction between those cases where
the scope of discovery is at stake and those where the issue is the speed or expense of discovery.
With its reference to "the importance to the litigation.., of the documents or other informa-
tion requested" as a relevant consideration, RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 437(1)(c), the Re-
statement implicitly suggests that it is primarily addressed to those situations where the scope
of discovery is at issue, that is, where the possibility exists of not obtaining important informa-
tion at all. The relevance of the speed or expense of discovery is left unaddressed.
The Restatement is thus generally limited in its utility to those situations where a court is
determining whether to compel a party to provide information under the Federal Rules to
protect the scope of discovery. Although the Court suggested that the Restatement factors
should merely "guide" a comity analysis, these additional considerations are highly relevant
and should not be excluded from consideration.
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III. An American Interests Approach to Comity
Lower courts need a unifying principle to guide them through the
large number of potentially conflicting factors that they must consider to
follow the Restatement's comity analysis for extraterritorial discovery
disputes. This Comment suggests that the underlying principle of a real-
istic comity anlysis is, in fact, very simple: consideration of American
interests only. In contrast to the Restatement's presumption of balanc-
ing U.S. interests against foreign interests, all comity requires is an exam-
ination of the U.S. interests that, in and of themselves, include
consideration of foreign interests. The Supreme Court hinted at the ulti-
mate primacy of American interests in Socidtd when, quoting Hilton v.
Guyot, it stated its unwillingness to compromise "the rights of its own
citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws."'74
Concerns about the interests of foreign states are similarly based in self-
interest, though they tend to be indirect long-term interests. Justice
Blackmun noted in his separate opinion in Socidtd some relevant com-
ments of Justice Story on the subject:
Justice Story used the phrase "comity of nations" to "express the true foun-
dation and extent of the obligation of the laws of one nation within the
territories of another. The true foundation on which the administration of
international law must rest is, that the rules which are to govern are those
which arise from mutual interest and utility, from a sense of the inconve-
niences which would result from a contrary doctrine, and from a sort of
moral necessity to do justice, in order that justice may be done to us in
return ."75
Justice Story thus emphasized the self-interest that motivates nations to
engage in a comity analysis.
Similarly, in their comments on section 437 of the Restatement, the
drafters recognized that the interests of the United States include
not merely the interest of the prosecuting or investigating agency in the
particular case, but the interests of the United States generally in interna-
tional cooperation in law enforcement and judicial assistance, in the joint
74. Socidtd, 107 S. Ct. at 2555 n.27 (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895)).
This quotation suggests that comity requires U.S. courts to operate within certain parameters.
On the one hand, "international duty and convenience" normally require that the "acts" of a
foreign sovereign be recognized. On the other hand, the nation according recognition need not
sacrifice the "rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its
laws." Id. These considerations thus represent boundaries rather than factors that are traded
off against one another.
75. Id at 2561 n.10 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citing J. STORY,





approach to problems of common concern, in the applicability of formal or
informal international agreements, and in effective international relations.
76
At the same time, however, the Restatement also proposes independ-
ent techniques for determining a foreign state's interest in a particular
case,77 and thus separates the discussion of foreign interests from that of
the United States' interest in effective and positive foreign relations. This
distinction is artificial; the reasons why American courts should examine
and consider foreign interests are already suggested by the listing of
American interests.
A. Ramifications of the American Interests Approach
Interpreting comity to require that American courts consider the
United States' interest in maintaining good relations with other coun-
tries, rather than the interests of foreign nations in and of themselves, has
numerous positive analytical ramifications. As an initial matter, instead
of viewing foreign interests as having independent value, under the
American interests approach the courts would determine as a practical
matter the potential damage that a decision in favor of the Federal Rules
might cause to relations with foreign nations. This determination would
involve an evaluation of the strength of the American interest in good
relations with a particular country, and a review of the possible harm
that might occur to those relations should the court employ the Federal
Rules.7
8
Following an American interests approach would provide the lower
courts with a more precise definition of comity to guide them in arriving
at decisions. In contrast to the amorphous zone between "obligation, on
the one hand, . . . [and] courtesy and good will, upon the other, ' 79 the
point at which American interests are maximized is a more specific stan-
dard that lower courts can apply to the choice between the Federal Rules
and the Convention. Under the vague standard currently endorsed by
the Supreme Court, lower courts have no guidance as to how seriously to
treat foreign interests. When those interests conflict with American
76. RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 437 comment c.
77. Id.
78. An objection to the American interests approach is that explicit acknowledgement of
the primacy of U.S. interests will offend foreign states, and might itself harm long-term Ameri-
can interests through retaliatory action by foreign states attempting to discourage use of the
Federal Rules. Such a backlash is already evident; many countries have passed blocking stat-
utes and in some cases have refused to enforce judgments by American courts. D. ROSEN-
THAL & W. KNIGHTON, supra note 32, at 75-76. The courts must treat this issue as a strategic
concern, and attempt to construct their opinions to propitiate foreign states while pursuing the
American interests rationale described herein.
79. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
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concerns, the lower courts are left to their own devices to determine
which should prevail. Under the American interests approach, the for-
eign interests could be only as weighty as the United States' desire for
positive relations with the nation in question, and then only to the extent
that frustration of the foreign interests would harm those relations. Con-
versely, the degree to which foreign interests conflict with American
principles of justice would tend to weigh against such interests from the
perspective of domestic American concerns. Straightforward balancing
of these considerations would provide an answer to the question of how
the court should treat the foreign interests and thus, in conjunction with
other relevant American interests, point to which discovery rules the
court should apply.
The results arrived at under the American interests test would also
differ from those provided by the alternative of weighing foreign and
American interests equally. Under the American interests approach to
comity, a foreign state may have a greater formal interest in having the
Convention applied than the United States has in seeing the Federal
Rules applied. The foreign interests may, however, be so repugnant or
contrary to American notions of justice that, although the simple balanc-
ing of interests might lead to application of the Convention (since the
foreign interest would be technically weightier than the U.S. interest), the
American desire for positive relations would not merit the compromise
of other important American interests such as judicial fairness. For ex-
ample, a foreign state might provide less discovery under the Convention
to foreign parties than it does to domestic parties seeking discovery under
the state's domestic procedures. In such a case, the foreign state would
argue that this difference in procedure represented a strong national in-
terest in protecting its citizens. Nonetheless, American'interests, how-
ever nominal, would still favor the use of the Federal Rules, since the
expressed foreign interest would not be worthy of significant
consideration.
The American interests approach is also acceptable from a separation
of powers perspective. This is true despite the fact that the notion of
courts conducting any type of international comity analysis seems to run
counter to the traditional separation of powers among the three branches
of the federal government. In an amicus brief in Socidtd, the Executive




resolving conflicts under the Convention,80 and Congress has not
objected.
It might be argued that this encouragement is only valid in the context
of a particular case, where a court is adjudicating primarily the interests
of the parties before it. This quintessentially judicial element would vali-
date the court's involvement in foreign relations. The American interests
approach, however, might be viewed as extraneous to the parties and to
the heart of the dispute, and thus more likely to encourage the sort of
policy-making typically reserved to the political branches. All cases in-
volving comity, however, necessarily involve considerations that go be-
yond the parties and into the realm of foreign relations. Even when a
court gives direct consideration to a foreign sovereign's interests, the
court is involved in as much, if not more, of an "executive" exercise than
when it views those interests from the perspective of long-term American
interests.8 ' Both types of interests go beyond the concerns of the particu-
lar parties involved in the dispute: a decision to sacrifice a foreign inter-
est is an executive-type decision, whether that interest is weighed directly
against U.S. interests or is considered simply as one factor in the U.S.
interest in positive relations. The Executive urged the Court to make this
type of determination in all extraterritorial discovery disputes in So-
ciiti s2 and even the Restatement clearly suggests that this process must
include consideration of how long-term American interests might be af-
fected by a decision bearing on foreign interests.
8 3
A reasoned comity analysis should thus go forward on the basis of the
honest and pragmatic realization that what are truly being balanced are
American interests that, in and of themselves, include consideration of
foreign interests.84 The lower courts would be performing their duties
80. Brief for the United States and the Securities and Exchange Commission at 19-20,
Socidtd (No. 85-1695). Note, however, that the Executive did not advocate the use of the
Restatement's factors in its brief. In fact, an American interests approach to comity would be
more respectful of the traditional separation of powers than the Restatement's equal balancing
of foreign and U.S. interests. See infra note 81.
81. In some instances, a more traditional approach of equally balancing foreign and Amer-
ican interests places a greater strain on the separation of powers. For instance, if a lower court
were to allow a foreign interest that is antithetical to American interests to prevail because the
foreign state felt particularly strongly about the issue, the court would be straining at the
boundary of its power in the area of foreign affairs, encroaching upon the Executive's efforts to
act in the United States' best interest in the arena of foreign relations. Any approach that
considers foreign interests as independently valid, instead of as relevant only to the American
interests that they promote or harm, ignores the fact that the foreign interests vary in legiti-
macy by American standards, forcing U.S. courts into the role of international arbiters.
82. Brief for the United States and the Securities and Exchange Commission at 19-20,
Soci dt (No. 85-1695).
83. RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 437 comment c.
84. Such an approach might conflict with Justice Blackmun's separate opinion where he
states that "[c]omity is not just a vague political concern favoring international cooperation
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within the parameters of the Supreme Court's declaration that comity is
neither a matter of absolute obligation nor of mere courtesy and good
will. Moreover, the American interests approach would provide lower
courts with a more precise rule of decision and a definition of comity
upon which an analytical framework could be constructed.
B. Application of the American Interests Approach
Assuming that a realistic comity analysis simply requires courts to
consider foreign interests solely as they impact upon the American inter-
est in positive foreign relations, a straightforward categorization of the
various American interests involved would provide a framework for a
comity analysis. In brief, each discovery dispute involving the Federal
Rules and the Convention essentially involves American policy interests
in both internal and foreign affairs. The United States has an immediate,
domestic interest in providing a just outcome for the participants in the
discovery dispute.8 5 It also has longer-term interests in advancing the
policies underlying the claim at issue. Finally, the United States has an
interest in ensuring that positive relations with foreign states are
maintained.
6
With regard to more immediate domestic concerns, when an individ-
ual seeks discovery under the Federal Rules, the implicit principles of
American justice underlying the discovery provisions of the Federal
Rules translate into an interest in providing the individual with speedy
and inexpensive87 discovery of a broad scope.88 On the other hand, the
United States does not want to unduly burden the individual from whom
discovery is sought.8 9 If utilization of the Federal Rules would work
some substantial hardship upon the individual resisting discovery, then
the U.S. desire for "just" treatment of the participants in the discovery
dispute should incline a court to forgo use of the Federal Rules. This
approach is supported by the Supreme Court's holding in Socidtd Inter-
nationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rog-
ers, where the Court held that a litigant who would have faced sanctions
in the country within which discovery was sought if he had provided
discovery under the Federal Rules should not be sanctioned by U.S.
courts for his failure to provide the information, since he had made a
when it is in our interest to do so." Socidtd, 107 S. Ct. at 2561 n.10 (Blackmun, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part).
85. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
86. See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 437 comment c.
87. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
88. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
89. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
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good faith effort to comply with the request.90 Under this rationale,
courts normally should forego discovery under the Federal Rules, if do-
ing so would cause some substantial injustice to the individual from
whom discovery is sought.
Of course, as the major thesis of this Comment has indicated, a U.S.
court is obliged to balance the individual equities to determine whether
American internal interests favor use of the Federal Rules or the Con-
vention. The short-term American interest articulated in the Federal
Rules in "just" treatment of the individuals involved in a discovery dis-
pute91 may thus lead to a different conclusion as to the applicability of
the Federal Rules than would a focus on positive U.S. foreign relations.
Only when these short-term, domestic policies weigh in favor of the Fed-
eral Rules, however, does a comity issue arise. Were the scales of Ameri-
can internal interests to tilt in favor of the Convention, then the U.S.
interest in positive relations with foreign states would not be a factor,
since the application of the Convention's procedures to discovery in sig-
natory nations would not threaten their sovereignty.
Assuming that in a particular case U.S. domestic, short-term interests
favor use of the Federal Rules, the issue then becomes whether the net
sum of the U.S. long-term policy and foreign relations interests similarly
supports application of the Federal Rules. Here again, there are two
sides to the issue. On the one hand, the United States has policy interests
of varying strength in rigorous enforcement of the law underlying the
substantive claim in dispute.92 Whether a government agency or a pri-
vate party is pursuing the claim, discovery that is adequate in scope,
speed, and cost is vital to the effective enforcement of the substantive law.
On the other hand, the foregoing must be balanced against the desire of
the United States to maintain good relations with other countries. If the
court determines that long-term American policy interests outweigh the
United States' desire for positive relations, then this determination, in
tandem with the earlier determination relating to immediate domestic
interests, would clearly indicate that application of the Federal Rules
would maximize American interests.
The most difficult cases will arise when the American short-term, do-
mestic policy interests do not outweigh the desire for positive relations.
In these instances, U.S. foreign affairs goals are pitted directly against
U.S. domestic principles mandating fair and effective discovery for the
individual litigant under the Federal Rules. Of course, the two types of
90. 357 U.S. 197 (1958); see also supra note 46.
91. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
92. See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 437 comment c.
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interests do not lend themselves well to comparison, for such a compari-
son would involve not merely the separate balancing of individual equi-
ties or of abstract national concerns; instead, it would require interactive
consideration of both.
But courts undertake this type of analysis frequently. National and
state governments often compromise individual rights for the sake of
some state objective through legislation. The courts have evaluated the
constitutionality of many such laws by weighing the importance of the
ostensible state objective against the extent to which the individual is
being compromised. 93 Disputes over application of the Federal Rules or
the Convention should be viewed in a similar manner, with the only dif-
ference being that it will largely be left to the courts to determine the




The recent history of comity analysis in the arena of American extra-
territorial discovery has been a confused one. The unguided efforts of the
lower courts have resulted in uncertain and unpredictable decisions of
questionable fairness and utility. Unfortunately, the vague decision by
93. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (Amish forced to pay social security
tax despite religious objections); Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1984) (woman
allowed not to have picture on driver's license for religious reasons), aff'd by an equally di-
vided Court, 472 U.S. 478 (1985).
94. When facing particularly difficult comity decisions, the lower courts might follow an
approach that is similar in effect to that which preceded adoption of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976,28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332, 1602-1611 (FSIA). The FSIA states that "a
foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the
States except as provided [for in certain cases]." Id. § 1604. In the years immediately prior to
the adoption of the FSIA, the State Department issued "Tate Letters" that expressed the ad-
ministration's position on whether the courts should grant foreign parties sovereign immunity.
See, e.g., 22 STATE DEP'T BULL. 984-85 (1952); see also First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Na-
cional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972) (discussing development of Bernstein exception which
permits judicial branch to respond to advice of executive branch and not apply Act of State
Doctrine); Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 173
F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1949); Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres S.A., 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947). Even after the passage of the FSIA, the State Department has
occasionally acted in an advisory role in determining entitlement to immunity. See, e.g.,
United States v. Arlington County, Va., 702 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1983). Having the Executive
advise the courts in a similar manner on difficult comity issues would help courts more accu-
rately assess American foreign policy interests. Although, as the Supreme Court noted in
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, "It cannot of course be thought that 'every case or
controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance,'" 376 U.S. 398,
423 (1984) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1964)), the Executive is usually better
situated to evaluate long-term American foreign policy interests. Furthermore, this solution
would be consistent with the Restatement, as it suggests that the involvement of the U.S.
Government would be a useful means of determining the United States' interests in a particu-




the Supreme Court in Socidtd has done little to alleviate the problem.
While the Court's reference to the factors in the Restatement might assist
lower courts in defining the American interests in certain cases, even the
Restatement is of limited use. Like the majority opinion in Socidt6, the
Restatement does not provide a clear underlying principle to guide a
comity analysis, nor do the factors proposed in the Restatement comprise
a complete list of relevant considerations.
The adoption of an American interests approach to comity would ef-
fectively eliminate many of the foregoing difficulties. As a threshold mat-
ter, it would provide U.S. courts with a sharp definition of the basic
interests truly at issue in a comity analysis-American interests-and
would therefore facilitate the development of a systematic means of
weighing the importance of those interests. Given that the natural objec-
tive of the balancing exercise is the maximization of American interests,
this schema would also provide a rule of decision and a way to evaluate
the relevance of specific factors, such as those included and excluded by
the Restatement.
Although the Supreme Court failed to provide principled guidance for
extraterritorial discovery disputes in Sociit6, the lower courts are not
compelled to repeat the mistakes of the past. Courts must now begin to
fashion principles to guide them in implementing the general standard set
forth in Socidtd. The American interests approach is one suggestion to
help them with this task.
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